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Abstract
It is commonplace in discussions of modern cosmology to assert that the early
universe began in a special state. Conventionally, cosmologists characterize this fine-
tuning in terms of the horizon and flatness problems. I argue that the fine-tuning is
real, but these problems aren’t the best way to think about it: causal disconnection of
separated regions isn’t the real problem, and flatness isn’t a problem at all. Fine-tuning
is better understood in terms of a measure on the space of trajectories: given reasonable
conditions in the late universe, the fraction of cosmological histories that were smooth
at early times is incredibly tiny. This discussion helps clarify what is required by a
complete theory of cosmological initial conditions. (Prepared for a volume of essays
commemorating David Albert’s Time and Chance, B. Loewer, E. Winsberg and B.
Weslake, eds.)
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1 Introduction
The issue of the initial conditions of the universe – in particular, the degree to which they
are “unnatural” or “fine-tuned,” and possible explanations thereof – is obviously of central
importance to cosmology, as well as to the foundations of statistical mechanics. The early
universe was a hot, dense, rapidly-expanding plasma, spatially flat and nearly homogeneous
along appropriately chosen spacelike surfaces.1 The question is, why was it like that? In
particular, the thinking goes, these conditions don’t seem to be what we would expect a
“randomly chosen” universe to look like, to the extent that such a concept makes any sense.
In addition to the obvious challenge to physics and cosmology of developing a theory of
initial conditions under which these properties might seem natural, it is a useful exercise to
specify as carefully as possible the sense in which they don’t seem natural from our current
point of view.
Philosophers of science (and some physicists [1, 2]) typically characterize the kind of fine-
tuning exhibited by the early universe as being a state of low entropy. This formulation has
been succinctly captured in David Albert’s Time and Chance as “The Past Hypothesis” [3].
A precise statement of the best version of the Past Hypothesis is the subject of an ongoing
discussion (see e.g. [4, 5]). But it corresponds roughly to the idea that the early universe –
at least the observable part of it, the aftermath of the hot Big Bang – was in a low-entropy
state with the right micro-structure to evolve in a thermodynamically sensible way into the
universe we see today.
Cosmologists, following Alan Guth’s influential paper on the inflationary-universe sce-
nario [6], tend to describe the fine-tuning of the early universe in terms of the horizon and
flatness problems.2 The horizon problem, which goes back to Misner [7], is based on the
causal structure of an approximately homogeneous and isotropic (Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker) cosmological model in general relativity. If matter and radiation (but not a cosmo-
logical constant) are the only sources of energy density in the universe, regions we observe
using the cosmic background radiation that are separated by more than about one degree
were never in causal contact – their past light-cones, traced back to the Big Bang, do not
intersect. It is therefore mysterious how they could be at the same temperature, despite the
impossibility in matter/radiation cosmology of any signal passing from one such point to
another. The flatness problem, meanwhile, was elucidated by Dicke and Peebles [8]. Spatial
curvature grows with respect to the energy density in matter or radiation, so it needs to be
extremely small at early times so as not to be completely dominant today. (For some history
of the horizon and flatness problems, see [9]. Brawer notes that neither the horizon problem
nor the flatness problem were considered of central importance to cosmology until inflation
suggested a solution to them.)
1Our concern here is the state of the universe – its specific configuration of matter and energy, and the
evolution of that configuration through time – rather than the coupling constants of our local laws of physics,
which may also be fine-tuned. I won’t be discussing the value of the cosmological constant, or the ratio of
dark matter to ordinary matter, or the matter/antimatter asymmetry.
2Guth also discussed the overabundance of magnetic monopoles predicted by certain grand unified the-
ories. This problem was the primary initial motivation for inflation, but is model-dependent in a way that
the horizon and flatness problems don’t seem to be.
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The horizon and flatness problems and the low entropy of the early universe are clearly
related in some way, but also seem importantly different. In this essay I will try to clarify
the nature of the horizon and flatness problems, and argue that they are not the best way
of thinking about the fine-tuning of the early universe.
The horizon problem gestures in the direction of a real puzzle, but the actual puzzle is
best characterized as fine-tuning within the space of cosmological trajectories, rather than
an inability of the early universe to equilibrate over large distances. This reformulation is
important for the status of inflationary cosmology, as it makes clear that inflation by itself
does not solve the problem (though it may play a crucial role in an ultimate solution).
The flatness problem, meanwhile, turns out to be simply a misunderstanding; the correct
measure on cosmological trajectories predicts that all but a set of measure zero should
be spatially flat. Correctly describing the sense in which the early universe is fine-tuned
helps us understand what kind of cosmological models physicists and philosophers should be
endeavoring to construct.
2 What Needs to be Explained
In order to understand the claim that the state of the universe appears fine-tuned, we
should specify what features of that state we are talking about. According to the standard
cosmological model, the part of the universe we are able to observe is expanding, and emerged
from a hot, dense Big Bang about fourteen billion years ago.3 The distribution of matter
and radiation at early times was nearly uniform, and the spatial geometry was very close
to flat. We see the aftermath of that period in the cosmic microwave background (CMB),
radiation from the time the universe became transparent about 380,000 years after the Big
Bang, known as the “surface of last scattering.” This radiation is extremely isotropic; its
observed temperature is 2.73 K, and is smooth to within about one part in 105 across the
sky [10]. Our observable region contains about 1088 particles, most of which are photons and
neutrinos, with about 1079 protons, neutrons, and electrons, as well as an unknown number
of dark matter particles. (The matter density of dark matter is well-determined, but the
mass per particle is extremely uncertain.) The universe has evolved today to a collection
of galaxies and clusters within a web of dark matter, spread homogeneously on large scales
over an expanse of tens of billions of light years.
Note that our confidence in this picture depends on assuming the Past Hypothesis. The
most relevant empirical information concerning the smoothness of the early universe comes
from the isotropy of the CMB, but that does not strictly imply uniformity at early times. It
is a geometric fact that a manifold that is isotropic around every point is also homogeneous;
hence, the observation of isotropy and the assumption that we do not live in a special place
together are often taken to imply that the matter distribution on spacelike slices is smooth.
But we don’t observe the surface of last scattering directly; what we observe is the isotropy of
3In classical general relativity such a state corresponds to a curvature singularity; in a more realistic
but less well-defined quantum theory of gravity, what we call the Big Bang may or may not have been the
absolute beginning of the universe, but at the least it is a moment prior to which we have no empirical
access.
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the temperature of the radiation field reaching our telescopes here in a much older universe.
That temperature is determined by a combination of two factors: the intrinsic temperature
at emission, and the subsequent redshift of the photons. The intrinsic temperature at the
surface of last scattering is mostly set by atomic physics, but not quite; because there
are so many more photons than atoms, recombination occurs at a temperature of about
3 eV, rather than the 13.6 eV characterizing the ionization energy of hydrogen. Taking the
photon-to-baryon ratio as fixed for convenience, our observations therefore imply that the
cosmological redshift is approximately uniform between us and the surface of last scattering
in all directions on the sky. But that is compatible with a wide variety of early conditions.
The redshift along any particular path is a single number; it is not possible to decompose
it into “Doppler” and “cosmic expansion” terms in a unique way [11]. This reflects the fact
that there are many ways to define spacelike slices in a perturbed cosmological spacetime.
For example, we can choose to define spacelike surfaces such that the cosmological fluid is
at rest at every point (“synchronous gauge”). In those coordinates there is no Doppler shift,
by construction. But the matter distribution at recombination could conceivably look very
inhomogeneous on such slices; that would be compatible with our current observations as
long as a direction-dependent cosmological redshift conspired to give an isotropic radiation
field near the Earth today. Alternatively, we could choose spacelike slices along which the
temperature was constant; the velocity of the fluid on such slices could be considerably non-
uniform, yet the corresponding Doppler effect could be canceled by the intervening expansion
of space along each direction. Such conspiratorial conditions seem unlikely to us, but they
are more numerous (in the measure to be discussed below) in the space of all possible initial
conditions. Of course, we also know that most past conditions that lead to a half-melted ice
cube in a glass of water look like a glass of liquid water at a uniform temperature, rather
than the unmelted ice cube in warmer water we would generally expect. In both cases,
our conventional reasoning assumes the kind of lower-entropy state postulated by the Past
Hypothesis.
With the caveat that the Past Hypothesis is necessary, let us assume that the universe
we are trying to account for is one that was very nearly uniform (and spatially flat) at early
times. What does it mean to day that such a state is fine-tuned?
Any fine-tuning is necessarily a statement about one’s expectations about what would
seem natural or non-tuned. In the case of the initial state of the universe, one might rea-
sonably suggest that we simply have no right to have any expectations at all, given that we
have only observed one universe. But this is a bit defeatist. While we have not observed an
ensemble of universes from which we might abstract ideas about what a natural one looks
like, we know that the universe is a physical system, and we can ask whether there is a
sensible measure on the relevant space of states for such a system, and then whether our
universe seems generic or highly atypical in that measure. In practice we typically use the
classical Liouville measure, as we will discuss in Section 4. The point of such an exercise is
not to say “We have a reliable theory of what universes should look like, and ours doesn’t
fit.” Rather, given that we admit that there is a lot about physics and cosmology that we
don’t yet understand, it’s to look for clues in the state of the universe that might help guide
us toward a more comprehensive theory. Fine-tuning arguments of this sort are extremely
important in modern cosmology, although the actual measure with respect to which such
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arguments are made are sometimes insinuated rather than expressly stated, and usually
posited rather than being carefully derived under some more general set of assumptions.
The fine-tuning argument requires one element in addition to the state and the measure: a
way to coarse-grain the space of states. This aspect is often overlooked in discussions of fine-
tuning, but it is again implicit. Without a coarse-graining, there is no way to say that any
particular state is “natural” or “fine-tuned,” even in a particular measure on the entire space
of states. Each individual state is just a point, with measure zero. What we really mean to
say is that states like that state are fine-tuned, in the sense that the corresponding macrostate
in some coarse-graining has a small total measure. The coarse-graining typically corresponds
to classifying states as equivalent if they display indistinguishable macroscopically observable
properties. It is usually not problematic, although as we will see it is necessary to be careful
when we consider quantities such as the spatial curvature of the universe.
Given a measure and a coarse-graining, it is natural to think of the entropy of each state,
defined by Boltzmann to be the logarithm of the volume of the corresponding macrostate.
Penrose has famously characterized the fine-tuning problem in these terms, emphasizing how
small the entropy of the early universe was compared to the current entropy, and how small
that is compared to how large the entropy could be [1]. At early times, when inhomogeneities
were small, we can take the entropy to simply be that of a gas of particles in the absence
of strong self-gravity, which is approximately given by the number of particles; for our
observable universe, that’s about 1088. Today, the entropy is dominated by supermassive
black holes at the center of galaxies, each of which has a Bekenstein-Hawking entropy
SBH =
A
4G
= 4πGM2 (1)
in units where ~ = c = kB = 1. The best estimates of the current entropy give numbers
of order 10103 [12]. Penrose suggests a greatest lower bound on the allowed entropy of
our observable universe by calculating what the entropy would be if all of the matter were
put into one gigantic black hole, obtaining the famous number 10122. Since the universe
is accelerating, distant galaxies will continue to move away from us rather than collapsing
together to form a black hole, but we can also calculate the entropy [13, 14] of the de Sitter
phase to which the universe will ultimately evolve, obtaining the same number 10122. (The
equality of these last two numbers can be explained by the cosmological coincidence of the
density in matter and vacuum energy; they are both of order 1/GH20 , where H0 is the current
Hubble parameter.) By any measure, the entropy of the early universe was fantastically
smaller than its largest possible value, which seems to be a fine-tuning.4 Part of our goal in
this essay is to relate this formulation to the horizon and flatness problems.
To close this section, we note that the early universe was in an extremely simple state,
in the sense that its “apparent complexity” is low: macroscopic features of the state can
be fully characterized by a very brief description (in contrast with the current state, where
a macroscopic description would still require specifying every galaxy, if not every star and
4Even though the comoving volume corresponding to our observable universe was much smaller at early
times, it was still the same physical system as the late universe, with the same space of states, governed by
presumably-reversible dynamical laws. It is therefore legitimate to calculate the maximum entropy of the
early universe by calculating the maximum entropy of the late universe.
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planet). But apparent complexity is a very different thing than entropy; the universe is
simple at the earliest times, and will be simple again at much later times, while entropy
increases monotonically [15]. The simplicity of the early universe should not in any way be
taken as a sign of its “naturalness.” A similar point has been emphasized by Price, who
notes that any definition of “natural” that purportedly applies to the early universe should
apply to the late universe as well [16]. The early universe appears fine-tuned because the
macroscopic features of its state represent a very small region of phase space in the Liouville
measure, regardless of how simple it may be.
3 The Horizon Problem
3.1 Defining the problem
We now turn to the horizon problem as traditionally understood. Consider a homogeneous
and isotropic universe with scale factor a(t), energy density ρ(a), and a fixed spatial curvature
κ. In general relativity, the evolution of the scale factor is governed by the Friedmann
equation,
H2 =
8πG
3
ρ− κ
a2
, (2)
where H = a˙/a is the Hubble parameter and G is Newton’s constant of gravitation, and we
use units where the speed of light is set equal to unity, c = 1. Often, the energy density will
evolve as a simple power of the scale factor, ρ ∝ a−n. For example, “matter” to a cosmologist
is any species of massive particles with velocities much less than the speed of light, for which
ρM ∝ a−3, while “radiation” is any species of massless or relativistic particles, for which
ρR ∝ a−4. (In both cases, the number density decreases as the volume increases, n ∝ a−3;
for matter the energy per particle is constant, while for radiation it diminishes as a−1 due
to the cosmological redshift.)
When the energy density of the universe is dominated by components with n > 2, a˙
will be decreasing, and we say the universe is “decelerating.” In a decelerating universe the
horizon size at time t∗ (the distance a photon can travel between the Big Bang and t∗) is
approximately
dhor(t∗) ≈ t∗ ≈ H−1∗ . (3)
We call H−1 the “Hubble distance” at any given epoch. Sometimes the Hubble distance
is conflated with the horizon size, but they are importantly different; the Hubble distance
depends only on the instantaneous expansion rate at any one moment in time, while the
horizon size depends on the entire past history of the universe back to the Big Bang. The
two are of the same order of magnitude in universes dominated by matter and radiation,
with the precise numerical factors set by the abundance of each component. A textbook
calculation shows that the Hubble distance at the surface of last scattering, when the CMB
was formed, corresponds to approximately one degree on the sky today.
The horizon problem, then, is simple. We look at widely-separated parts of the sky, and
observe radiation left over from the early universe. As an empirical matter, the temperatures
we observe in different directions are very nearly equal. But the physical locations from which
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that radiation has traveled were separated by distances larger than the Hubble distance (and
therefore the horizon size, if the universe is dominated by matter and radiation) at that
time. They were never in causal contact; no prior influence could have reached both points
by traveling at speeds less than equal to that of light. Yet these independent regions seem
to have conspired to display the same temperature to us. That seems like an unnatural state
of affairs. We can formalize this as:
Horizon problem (causal version). If different regions in the early universe
have non-overlapping past light cones, no causal influence could have coordinated
their conditions and evolution. There is therefore no reason for them to appear
similar to us today.
If that’s as far as it goes, the horizon problem is perfectly well-formulated, if somewhat
subjective. The causal formulation merely points out that there is no reason for a certain
state of affairs (equal temperatures of causally disconnected regions) to obtain, but it doesn’t
give any reason for expecting otherwise. Characterizing this as a “problem,” rather than
merely an empirical fact to be noted and filed away, requires some positive expectation for
what we think conditions near the Big Bang should be like: some reason to think that
unequal temperatures would be more likely, or at least less surprising.
3.2 Equilibration and entropy
We can attempt to beef up the impact of the horizon problem by bringing in the notion of
equilibration between different regions. Imagine we have a box of gas containing different
components, or simply different densities. If it starts from an inhomogeneous (low-entropy)
configuration, given time the gas will typically equilibrate and attain a uniform distribution.
In that sense, an equal temperature across a hot plasma actually seems natural or likely.
But if we think of the early universe as such a box of gas, it hasn’t had time to equilibrate.
That’s a direct consequence of the fact that (in a matter/radiation dominated universe) the
horizon size is much smaller than the scales over which we are currently observing. Let’s call
this the “equilibration” version of the horizon problem.
Horizon problem (equilibration version). If different regions in the early
universe shared a causal past, they could have equilibrated and come to the same
temperature. But when they do not, such as in a matter/radiation-dominated
universe, equal temperatures are puzzling.
The equilibration formulation of the horizon problem seems stronger than the causal
version; it attempts to provide some reason why equal temperatures across causally discon-
nected reasons should be surprising, rather than merely noting their existence. But in fact
this version undermines the usual conclusions that the horizon problem is intended to justify,
and invites a critique that has been advanced by Sheldon Goldstein [17]. I will try to argue
that Goldstein’s critique doesn’t rebut the claim that the early universe is fine-tuned, though
it does highlight the misleading nature of the equilibration version of the horizon problem.
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The problem arises when we try to be more specific about what might count as “natural”
initial conditions in the first place. If we trace the Friedmann equation (2) backwards in
time, we come to a singularity – a point where the scale factor is zero and the density
and Hubble parameter are infinite. There is no reason to expect the equations of classical
general relativity to apply in such circumstances; at the very least, quantum effects will
become important, and we require some understanding of quantum gravity to make sensible
statements. Absent such a theory, there would be some justification in giving up on the
problem entirely, and simply saying that the issue of initial conditions can’t be addressed
without a working model of quantum gravity. (Presumably this was the feeling among many
cosmologists before inflation was proposed.)
Alternatively, we could choose to be a bit more optimistic, and ask what kind of con-
figurations would constitute natural initial conditions in the moments right after the initial
singularity or whatever quantum phase replaces it. Given the phase space describing the
relevant degrees of freedom in that regime, we can coarse-grain into macrostates defined by
approximately equal values of macroscopically observable quantities and define the Boltz-
mann entropy as the logarithm of the volume of the macrostate of which the microstate is
an element, as discussed in Section 2. Calculating this volume clearly requires the use of
a measure on the space of states; fortunately such a measure exists, given by Liouville in
the classical case or by the Hilbert-space inner product in the quantum case. Given that
machinery, states with high Boltzmann entropy seem natural or generic or likely, simply
because there are many of them; states with low Boltzmann entropy seem unnatural since
they are relatively few, and suggest the need for some sort of explanation.5
Let’s apply this to a matter/radiation-dominated universe, in which different regions we
observe in the CMB are out of causal contact. Following Goldstein, we can draw an analogy
with two isolated boxes of gas. The boxes could be different sizes, and have never interacted.
All we know is that there is some fixed number of particles in the boxes, with some fixed
energy. Goldstein’s observation is that, if we know nothing at all about the particles inside
the two boxes, it should be completely unsurprising if they had the same temperature. The
reasoning is simple: at fixed energy and particle number, there is more phase space corre-
sponding to approximately equal-temperature configurations than to unequal-temperature
ones. Such configurations maximize the Boltzmann entropy. Given the two boxes, some fixed
number of particles, and some fixed total energy, a randomly-chosen point in phase space
is very likely to feature equal temperatures in each box, even if they have never interacted.
Therefore, one might tentatively suggest, perhaps seeing equal temperatures in causally dis-
connected parts of the early universe isn’t actually unlikely at all, and the horizon problem
shouldn’t be a big worry.
5Note that the expectation of high entropy for the early universe, whether convincing or not, certainly
has a different character than our expectation that long-lived closed systems will be high-entropy in the real
world. In the latter case, there is a dynamical mechanism at work: almost all initial conditions will evolve
toward equilibrium. In the case of the early universe, by contrast, we are actually making a statement about
the initial conditions themselves, saying that high-entropy ones would be less surprising than low-entropy
ones, since the former are more numerous.
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3.3 Gravity and dynamics
For isolated boxes of gas, this logic is surprising, but valid. A randomly-selected state of two
isolated boxes of gas is likely to have equal temperatures in each box, even in the absence
of interactions. For the early universe, however, the boxes turn out to not provide a very
useful analogy, for a couple of (related) reasons: the importance of gravity, and the fact that
we are considering time-dependent trajectories, not simply individual states.
Gravity plays the crucial role in explaining a peculiar feature of the early universe: it
is purportedly a low-entropy state, but one in which the matter is radiating as a nearly-
homogeneous black body, exactly as we are trained to expect from systems in thermal equi-
librium. The simple resolution is that, when the self-gravity of a collection of particles
becomes important, high-entropy configurations of specified volume and density are inho-
mogeneous rather than homogeneous. Therefore, if the imaginary boxes that we consider
are sufficiently large, we wouldn’t expect the temperature to be uniform even inside a single
box, much less between two boxes.
This can be seen in a couple of different ways. One is to consider the Jeans instability:
the tendency of sufficiently long-wavelength perturbations in a self-gravitating fluid to grow.
In a fluid with density ρ and speed of sound cs, modes are unstable to growth if they are
larger than the Jeans length,
λJ =
cs
(Gρ)1/2
. (4)
If the size of a box of gas is greater than the Jeans length for that gas, the distribution will
fragment into self-gravitating systems of size λJ or smaller, rather than remaining homoge-
neous; in cosmology, that’s the process of structure formation. Given the fluid pressure p as
a function of the energy density, the speed of sound is defined by c2s = dp/dρ. For a radia-
tion bath it is cR = 1/
√
3, while for collisionless nonrelativistic particles we have cM ≈ 0; a
cosmological matter fluid is unstable to growth of inhomogeneities on all scales.6 Classically,
the only perfectly stable configuration of fixed energy in a fixed volume would be a black
hole in vacuum, which is about as inhomogeneous as you can get.
Another way of reaching the same conclusion (randomly-chosen states of self-gravitating
particles are likely to be inhomogeneous) is to examine phase-space volumes directly. Con-
sider a collection of particles with a given energy, interacting only through the inverse-square
law of Newtonian gravity. It is clear that the volume of phase space accessible to such a
system is unbounded. Keeping the energy fixed, we can send any number of particles to
infinity (or arbitrarily large momentum) while compensating by moving other particles very
close together, sending their mutual energy to minus infinity. This is a real effect, familiar
to researchers in galactic dynamics as the “gravo-thermal catastrophe” [18, 19]. A galaxy
populated by stars (or dark matter particles) interacting through Newtonian gravity will
6This story is complicated by the expansion of the universe, since the Hubble parameter acts as a friction
term; in a purely radiation-dominated Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe, density perturbations actually
shrink as the universe expands. But even when radiation dominates the energy density, there are still
slowly-moving matter particles. Given sufficient time in a hypothetical non-expanding universe, density
perturbations in non-relativistic matter would grow very large. This leads us to the discussion of trajectories
rather than states, which we undertake in the next section.
9
tend to become centrally condensed without limit, while ejecting other stars to infinity. The
entropy of such a system is unbounded, and there is no equilibrium configuration, but generic
evolution is in the direction of greater inhomogeneity. And, indeed, in semiclassical general
relativity, the highest-entropy configuration of fixed energy in a fixed volume is generally a
black hole when the energy is sufficiently high.7
In the early universe, the Jeans length is generally less than the Hubble radius (although
they are of the same order for purely-radiation fluids). High-entropy states will generally
be very inhomogeneous, in stark contrast with the intuition we have from boxes of gas with
negligible self-gravity, in accordance with Penrose’s analysis mention in Section 2. Hence,
the equilibration version of the horizon problem is extremely misleading, if not outright
incorrect. In an alternative world in which particles could still gravitationally attract each
other but the universe was not expanding, so that past light cones stretched forever and
the horizons of any two points necessarily overlapped, our expectation would not be for
a smooth universe with nearly constant temperatures throughout space. It would be for
the opposite: a highly inhomogeneous configuration with wildly non-constant temperatures.
Whatever the fine-tuning problem associated with the early universe may be, it is not that
“distant regions have not had time to come into thermal equilibrium.” Indeed, the lack of
time to equilibrate is seen to be a feature, rather than a bug: it would be even harder to
understand the observed uniformity of the CMB if the plasma had had an arbitrarily long
time to equilibrate.
From this perspective, the thermal nature of the CMB radiation is especially puzzling. It
cannot be attributed to “thermal equilibrium,” since the early plasma is not in equilibrium in
any sense.8 Sometimes an attempt is made to distinguish between “gravitational” and “non-
gravitational” degrees of freedom, and argue that the non-gravitational degrees of freedom
are in equilibrium, while the gravitational ones are not. This is problematic at best. The
relevant gravitational effect isn’t one of degrees of freedom (which would be independently-
propagating gravitational waves or gravitons), but the simple existence of gravity as a force.
One might try to argue that the primordial plasma looks (almost) like it would look in an
equilibrium configuration in a universe where there was no force due to gravity, but it is
unclear what force such an observation is supposed to have.9
The same conclusion can be reached in a complementary way, by recalling that we are
considering a highly time-dependent situation, rather than two boxes of gas at rest. As
mentioned in Section 2, there is a great amount of freedom in choosing spatial hypersurfaces
in a perturbed cosmological spacetime; for example, we could choose the temperature of the
fluid as our time coordinate (as long as the fluid was not so inhomogeneous that constant-
7When the energy is too low, any black hole will have a higher Hawking temperature than its surroundings,
and it will lose energy and shrink. Its temperature will grow as the hole loses mass, and eventually it will
evaporate completely away. This is a reflection of the fact that black holes have negative specific heat.
8This is trivial, of course. Equilibrium states are time-independent, while the early universe is expanding
and evolving. More formally, there is no timelike Killing vector.
9There has been at least one attempt to formalize this notion, by inventing a scenario in which the strength
of gravity goes to zero in the very early universe [20]. While intriguing, from the trajectory-centered point
of view advocated in the next section even this model doesn’t explain why our observed universe exhibits
such an unlikely cosmological history.
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temperature surfaces were no longer spacelike). Then, by construction, the temperature is
completely uniform at any moment of time. But we are not observing the CMB at the
moment of recombination; the photons we see have been redshifted by a factor of over a
thousand. From that perspective, the question is not “Why was the temperature uniform on
spacelike hypersurfaces?”, but rather “Why is the redshift approximately equal in completely
separate directions on the sky?”10 This formulation suggests the importance of considering
cosmological trajectories, which we turn to in Section 4.
3.4 Inflation
It is useful to see how inflation addresses the horizon problem. At the level of the causal
version, all inflation needs to do is invoke an extended period of accelerated expansion. Then
the past horizon size associated with a spacetime event becomes much larger than the Hubble
radius at that time, and widely-separated points on the surface of last scattering can easily
be in causal contact. We can quantify the total amount of inflation in terms of the number
of e-folds of expansion,
Ne =
∫ af
ai
d ln a =
∫ tf
ti
H dt. (5)
where the integral extends from the beginning to the end of the period of accelerated expan-
sion (a¨ > 0). Generally, at least Ne > 50 e-folds of inflation are required to ensure that all
the observed regions of the CMB share a causal patch.
Whether or not these regions have “equilibrated” depends on one’s definitions. During
inflation, the energy density of the universe is dominated by the approximately-constant po-
tential energy of a slowly-rolling scalar field. The evolution is approximately adiabatic, until
reheating when inflation ends and the inflaton energy converts into matter and radiation.
Perturbations generically shrink during the inflationary period, in accordance with intuition
from the cosmic no-hair theorem [21], which states that a universe dominated by a positive
cosmological constant approach a de Sitter geometry. But it is not a matter of interactions
between degrees of freedom in different regions sharing energy, as in a conventional equi-
libration process; perturbations simply decrease locally and independently as the universe
expands.
Once accelerated expansion occurs, it is important that inflation end in such a way that
homogeneous and isotropic spatial slices persist after reheating (when energy in the inflaton
field is converted into matter and radiation). The success of this step is highly non-trivial;
indeed, this “graceful-exit problem” was highlighted by Guth [6] in his original paper, which
relied on bubble nucleation to enact the transition from a metastable false vacuum state to
the true vacuum. Unfortunately, there are only two regimes for such a process; if bubbles are
produced rapidly, inflation quickly ends and does not last for sufficient e-folds to address the
horizon problem, while if they are produced slowly, we are left with a wildly inhomogeneous
10Alternatively and equivalently, we could define spacelike hypersurfaces by demanding that each hyper-
surface be at a constant redshift factor from the present time. On such surfaces the temperature would
generically be very non-uniform. In these coordinates the question becomes, “Why did distant regions of
the universe reach the recombination temperature at the same time?”
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universe where a few bubbles have appeared and collided while inflation continues in the
false vacuum elsewhere. An attractive solution to this dilemma came in the form of slow-
roll inflation [22, 23]. Here the field is not trapped in a false vacuum, but rolls gradually
down its potential. Slow-roll inflation can very naturally produce homogeneous and isotropic
spatial slices, even if it proceeds for a very large number of e-folds. Central to the success
of this model is the fact that the rolling field acts as a “clock,” allowing regions that have
been inflated to extreme distances to undergo reheating at compatible times [24]. It is thus
crucially important that the universe during slow-roll inflation is not truly in equilibrium,
even though its evolution is is approximately adiabatic; the evolving inflaton field allows for
apparent coordination among widely-separated regions.
Inflation, therefore, solves the puzzle raised by the horizon problem, in the following sense:
given a sufficient amount of inflation, and a model that gracefully exits from the inflationary
phase, we can obtain a homogeneous and isotropic universe in which distant points share
a common causal past. The success of this picture can obscure an important point: the
conditions required to get inflation started in the first place are extremely fine-tuned. This
fine-tuning is often expressed in terms of entropy; a patch of spacetime ready to begin
inflating has an enormously lower entropy than the (still quite low-entropy) homogeneous
plasma into which it evolves [1, 2]. In this sense, inflation “explains” the fine-tuned nature
of the early universe by positing an initial condition that is even more fine-tuned. In the
context of the horizon problem, this issue can be sharpened. One can show that, in order for
inflation to begin, we must not only have very particular initial conditions in which potential
energy dominates over kinetic and gradient energies, but that the size of the patch over
which these conditions obtain must be strictly larger than the Hubble radius [25]. In other
words, even in an inflationary scenario, it is necessary to invoke smooth initial conditions
over super-horizon-sized distances. As compelling as inflation may be, it still requires some
understanding of pre-inflationary conditions to qualify as a successful model.
Contemporary discussion of inflation often side-steps the problem of the required low-
entropy initial condition by appealing to the phenomenon of eternal inflation: in many
models, if inflation begins at all it continues without end in some regions of the universe,
creating an infinite amount of spacetime volume [26]. While plausible (although for some
recent concerns see [27]), this scenario raises a new problem: rather than uniquely predicting
a universe like the kind we see, inflation predicts an infinite variety of universes, making
prediction a difficult problem. I won’t discuss this issue here, but for recent commentary see
[28, 29, 30, 31].
4 Trajectories
4.1 Initial Conditions and Histories
The horizon problem, as discussed in the previous section, might not seem like an extremely
pressing issue. The causal version is fairly weak, merely noting a state of affairs rather than
offering any reason why we should expect the contrary, while the equilibration version is
misleading – the problem is not that distant regions are unable to equilibrate, it’s that equi-
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libration would have made things more inhomogeneous. Nevertheless, there is no question
that the early universe is fine-tuned. A better statement of the fine-tuning problem comes
from considering cosmological trajectories – histories of the universe over time – rather than
concentrating on initial conditions.
The relationship between initial conditions and trajectories is somewhat different in clas-
sical mechanics and quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics, the space of trajectories of
a system with a fixed phase space and time-independent Hamiltonian is isomorphic to the
space of initial conditions, or indeed the space of possible conditions at any specified moment
of time. We can think of the history of a classical system as a path through a phase space
Γ with coordinates {qi, pi}, where the {qi} are canonical coordinates and the {pi} are their
conjugate momenta, governed by a Hamiltonian H(qi, pi) (which for our purposes is taken
to be time-independent). Evolution is unitary (information-conserving), implying that the
state at any one time plus the Hamiltonian is sufficient to determine the state at any prior
or subsequent time. Classically, however, trajectories (and time itself) can come to an end;
that’s what happens at spacelike singularities such as the Big Bang or inside a Schwarzschild
black hole. This reflects the great amount of freedom that exists in choosing the geometry of
phase space, including the possible existence of singular points on the manifold. It is there-
fore possible for some conditions to be truly “initial,” if they occur at the past boundary of
the time evolution.
In quantum mechanics, there are no singularities or special points in the state space.
A general solution to the Schro¨dinger equation Hˆ|ψ〉 = i∂t|ψ〉 with a time-independent
Hamiltonian can be written in terms of energy eigenstates as
|ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
rne
i(θi−Ent)|En〉, (6)
where the constant real parameters {ri, θi} define the specific state. Each eigenstate merely
rotates by a phase, singularities cannot arise, and time extends infinitely toward the past
and future [32].11 In contrast to the arbitrariness of classical phase space, the geometry of
pure quantum states is fixed to be CP n, and evolution is always smooth [36, 37, 38]. There
is then no special “initial” condition; the state at any one time can be evolved infinitely
far into the past and future. When we come to quantum gravity, canonical quantization of
general relativity suggests [39] that the wave function of the universe may be an exact energy
eigenstate with zero eigenvalue, as reflected in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation:
Hˆ|ψ〉 = 0, (7)
where the Hamiltonian Hˆ includes both gravitational and matter dynamics. In that case
there is no time evolution in the conventional sense, although time can conceivably be re-
11The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin (BGV) theorem [33] demonstrates that spacetimes with an average expansion
rate greater than zero must be geodesically incomplete in the past (which is almost, but not quite, equivalent
to saying there are singularities). This has been put forward as evidence that the universe must have had a
beginning [34]; there are explicit counterexamples to this claim [35], but such examples are arguably unstable
or at least non-generic. However, while the BGV theorem does not assume Einstein’s equation or any other
equations of motion, it only makes statements about classical spacetime. It is therefore silent on the question
of what happens when gravity is quantized.
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covered as an effective concept describing correlations between a “clock” subsystem and
the rest of the quantum state [40, 41]. It is nevertheless far from clear that the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation is the proper approach to quantum gravity, or indeed that local space-
time curvature is the proper thing to quantize. Evidence from the holographic principle
[42, 43, 44], black hole complementarity [45], the gauge-gravity correspondence [46, 47],
the entanglement/spacetime connection [48, 49, 50, 51], and thermodynamic approaches to
gravity [52, 53] suggests that gravity can be thought of emerging from non-local degrees of
freedom, only indirectly related to curved spacetime. Given the current state of the art,
then, it is safest to leave open the question of whether time is emergent or fundamental, and
whether it is eternal or has a beginning.
Fortunately, this uncertainty over whether conditions can truly be initial does not prevent
us from talking about cosmological fine-tuning. For most of the history of the universe, many
important cosmological quantities are well-described by classical dynamics. This includes the
expansion of the scale factor, as well as the evolution of perturbations, considered as modes in
Fourier space of fixed comoving wavelength (i.e., expanding along with the universe).12 On
small scales the dynamics are nonlinear and entropy-generating, due to a variety of processes
such as star formation, supernovae, magnetic fields, and violent gravitational relaxation.
Consequently, the evolution at those wavelengths is not well-approximated by reversible
equations on phase space. This leaves us, however, with the dynamics on large scales –
in the present universe, more then ten million light-years across – that can be treated as
the Hamiltonian evolution of an autonomous set of degrees of freedom. Therefore, we can
circumvent conceptual problems raised by the idea of “initial conditions” by simply asking
whether the trajectory of the large-scale universe since the aftermath of the Big Bang is
natural, or fine-tuned, in the space of all such trajectories.
4.2 The Canonical Measure
Fortunately, it is possible to construct a preferred measure on the space of trajectories, which
we can use to judge the amount of fine-tuning exhibited by our real universe. We start by
considering the measure on phase space itself, and use that to find a measure on the space
of paths through phase space that represent solutions to the equations of motion.13
In classical mechanics, there is a natural measure on phase space Γ, the Liouville measure.
To construct it in terms of coordinates {qi} and momenta {pi}, we first write down the
symplectic 2-form on Γ,
ω =
n∑
i=1
dpi ∧ dqi. (8)
12Inflation is an important exception. During inflation itself, the state of the universe has essentially only
one branch. When inflation ends, reheating creates a large number of excited degrees of freedom, effectively
“measuring” the state of the inflaton and causing the wave function to split into many branches [27]. This
process explains how a perturbed post-inflationary universe can develop out of an unperturbed inflationary
state.
13This notion of a cosmological measure is completely separate from that which arises in what is sometimes
called “the measure problem in cosmology, which deals with the relative frequency of different kinds of
observers in a multiverse. See e.g. [54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59].
14
Note that the dimension of Γ is 2n. The Liouville measure is then a 2n-form given by
Ω =
(−1)n(n−1)/2
n!
ωn. (9)
All that matters for our current purposes is that such a measure exists, and is uniquely de-
fined. What makes the Liouville measure special is that it is conserved under time evolution.
That is, given states that initially cover some region S ⊂ Γ and that evolve under Hamilton’s
equations to cover region S ′, we have ∫
S
Ω =
∫
S′
Ω. (10)
Classical statistical mechanics assumes that systems in equilibrium have a probability dis-
tribution in phase space that is uniform with respect to this measure, subject to appropriate
macroscopic constraints. Meanwhile, in connecting cosmology with statistical mechanics, we
assume that the microstate of the early universe is chosen randomly from a uniform distri-
bution in the Liouville measure, subject to the (severe) constraint that the macrocondition
has the low-entropy form given by the Past Hypothesis. Albert [3] calls this the “Statistical
Postulate”.14 Of course one can question why probabilities should be uniform in this mea-
sure rather than some other one. Even if the Liouville measure is somehow picked out by the
dynamics by virtue of being conserved under evolution, we are nevertheless free to construct
any measure we like. For our present purposes, this kind of question seems misguided. As
discussed in Section 2, the point of fine-tuning arguments is to find clues that can guide us to
inventing more comprehensive physical theories. We are not arguing for some metaphysical
principle to the effect that the universe should be chosen uniformly in phase space according
to the Liouville measure; merely that, given this measure’s unique status as being picked
out by the dynamics, states that look natural in this measure tell us very little, while states
that look unnatural might reveal useful information. (See [61] for a critique of the use of
cosmological measures in the way I am advocating here.)
In general, having a measure on phase space Γ does not induce a natural measure on
the space of trajectories T , which is one dimension lower. (There is a natural map Γ → T ,
which simply sends each point to the trajectory it is on; however, while differential forms
can be pulled back under such maps, they cannot in general be pushed forward [62].) In
the case of general relativity, Gibbons, Hawking and Stewart (GHS, [63]) showed that there
is nevertheless a unique measure satisfying a small number of reasonable constraints: it is
positive, independent of coordinate choices, respects the symmetries of the theory, and does
not require the introduction of any additional structures. GHS relied on the fact that general
relativity is a constrained Hamiltonian system: because the metric component g00 is not a
propagating degree of freedom in the Einstein–Hilbert action, physical trajectories obey a
constraint of the form H = H⋆, where H is the Hamiltonian and H⋆ is a constant defining
the constraint surface. (In cosmological spacetimes we generally have H⋆ = 0.) The space U
14Albert and Loewer have referred to the combined package of the dynamical laws, the Past Hypothesis,
and the Statistical Postulate as the “Mentaculus,” from the Coen brothers film A Serious Man (see e.g.
[60]).
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of physical trajectories – those obeying the Hamiltonian constraint – is thus two dimensions
lower than the full phase space Γ. GHS construct a measure on U by identifying the nth
coordinate on phase space as time t, for which H is the conjugate variable. The symplectic
form (8) is then
ω = ω˜ + dH ∧ dt, (11)
where
ω˜ ≡
n−1∑
i=1
dpi ∧ dqi. (12)
GHS show that the (2n− 2)-form
Θ =
(−1)(n−1)(n−2)/2
(n− 1)! ω˜
n−1 (13)
is a unique measure satisfying their criteria.
The GHS measure (13) has the attractive feature that it is expressed locally in phase
space. Therefore, it can be evaluated on the space of trajectories simply by choosing some
transverse surface through which all trajectories (or all trajectories of interest for some
purpose) pass, and calculating Θ on that surface; the results are independent of the surface
chosen. In cosmology, for example, we might choose surfaces of constant Hubble parameter,
or constant energy density, and evaluate the measure at that time. This feature has a crucial
consequence: the total measure on some particular kind of trajectories, such as ones that
are spatially flat or ones that are relatively smooth at some particular cosmological epoch, is
completely independent of what the trajectories are doing at some other cosmological epoch.
Therefore, changing the dynamics in the early universe (such as modifying the potential for
an inflaton field) cannot possible change the fraction of trajectories with certain specified
properties in the late universe. (Adding additional degrees of freedom can, of course, alter
the calculation of the measure.) New physics cannot change “unnatural” trajectories into
“natural” ones.
At heart, there is not much conceptual difference between studying the purported fine-
tuning of the universe in terms of the measure on trajectories and quantifying the low
entropy of the early state. There are relatively few initial conditions with low entropy, and
the trajectories that begin from such conditions will have a small measure. As discussed in
Section 2, in order to quantify fine-tuning, we generally need to specify a coarse-graining on
the space of states as well as a measure. In the language of trajectories, this corresponds
to specifying macroconditions the trajectories must satisfy. One benefit of the trajectory
formalism is that it is relatively straightforward to ask questions that conditionalize over
macroconditions specified at a different time; for example, we can talk about the fraction of
the trajectories that are smooth at one time given that they are smooth at some other time.
Another benefit, and a considerable one, is that we can look at features of cosmic evolution
that we truly understand without claiming to have full control over the space of states
(as would be necessary to completely understand the entropy). An objection to Penrose’s
argument is sometimes raised that we don’t know enough about how to calculate the entropy
in quantum gravity to make any statements at all; using the measure on classical trajectories
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allows us to make fine-tuning arguments while remaining wholly in a regime where classical
general relativity should be completely valid.
4.3 Flatness
An interesting, and surprisingly nontrivial, application of the GHS measure is to the flatness
problem – as we will see, it doesn’t really exist. (In this section and the next I am drawing on
work from [64].) Consider a Robertson-Walker universe with scale factor a(t) and curvature
parameter κ, obeying the Friedmann equation (2), with an energy density from components
ρi that each scale as a power law, ρi = ρi0a
−ni for some fixed ni. This includes the cases
of nonrelativistic matter, for which we have nM = 3, and radiation, for which nR = 4.
Then we can define the corresponding density parameters Ωi, as well as an “effective density
parameter for curvature,” via
Ωi ≡ 8πGρi0a
−ni
3H2
, Ωκ ≡ − κ
a2H2
. (14)
The Friedmann equation then implies that
∑
iΩi + Ωκ = 1. The ratio of the curvature to
one of the densities evolves with time as
Ωκ
Ωi
∝ ani−2. (15)
Whenever ni > 2, as for matter or radiation, the relative of importance of curvature grows
with time. The conventional flatness problem is simply the observation that, since the
curvature is not very large today, it must have been extremely small indeed at early times.
Roughly speaking (since details depend on the amounts of matter, radiation, and vacuum
energy, as well as their evolutions), we must have had Ωκ/Ωmatter/radiation < 10
−55 in the very
early universe in order that the curvature not dominate today.
As we have argued, however, such a statement only has impact if the set of trajectories for
which Ωκ/Ωmatter/radiation < 10
−55 in the very early universe is actually small. It seems small,
since 10−55 is a small number. But that just means that it would be small if trajectories were
chosen uniformly in the variable Ωκ/Ωmatter/radiation, for which we have given no independent
justification. Clearly, this is a job for the GHS measure.
To make things quantitative, consider a Robertson-Walker universe containing a homoge-
neous scalar field φ(t) with potential V (φ). (A scalar field is more directly applicable than a
matter or radiation fluid, since the scalar has a Hamiltonian formulation; one can, however,
consider scalar field theories that mimic the behavior of such fluids, so no real generality is
lost.) The scale factor will obey the Friedmann equation (2), with the energy density given
by
ρφ =
1
2
φ˙2 + V (φ). (16)
The dynamical coordinates for this model are a and φ, with conjugate momenta pa and
pφ, as well as a Lagrange multiplier N (the lapse function) that enforces the Hamiltonian
constraint. The lapse function is essentially the square root of the 00 component of the
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metric; it is non-dynamical in general relativity, since no time derivatives of g00 appear in
the action. Setting 8πG = 1 for convenience, the Einstein-Hilbert Lagrangian for the scale
factor coupled to the scalar field is
L = 3
(
Naκ− aa˙
2
N
)
+ a3
[
φ˙2
2N
−NV (φ)
]
. (17)
The canonical momenta, defined as pi = ∂L/∂q˙i, are
pN = 0, pa = −6N−1aa˙, and pφ = N−1a3φ˙. (18)
Performing a Legendre transformation, the Hamiltonian is
H = N
[
− p
2
a
12a
+
p2φ
2a3
+ a3V (φ)− 3aκ
]
. (19)
The equation of motion for N sets it equal to an arbitrary constant, which we can choose to
be unity. Varying the action with respect to N gives the Hamiltonian constraint, H⋆ = 0,
which is equivalent to the Friedmann equation. Setting N = 1, the remaining phase space
Γ is four-dimensional. The Hamiltonian constraint surface is three-dimensional, and the
space of physical trajectories U is two-dimensional. The GHS measure can be written as the
Liouville measure subject to the Hamiltonian constraint:
Θ = (dpa ∧ da+ dpφ ∧ dφ)|H=0 . (20)
The measure can be evaluated in expanding Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universes by
integrating (20) over a specified transverse surface, for example by setting H = H∗. The
answer works out to be
µ ≡
∫
H=H∗
Θ (21)
=
∫
H=H∗
Θaφ da dφ (22)
= −6
∫
H=H∗
3a3H2
∗
− a3V + 2ak
(6a2H2∗ − 2a2V + 6k)1/2
da dφ. (23)
We can make this expression look more physically transparent by introducing the variable
ΩV ≡ V (φ)
3H2
, (24)
as well as the curvature density parameter defined in (14). The scale factor is strictly positive,
so that integrating over all values of Ωκ is equivalent to integrating over all values of a. The
measure is then
µ = 3
√
3
2
H−2∗
∫
H=H∗
1− ΩV − 23Ωκ
|Ωκ|5/2 (1− ΩV − Ωκ)1/2
dΩκ dφ. (25)
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This integral is divergent; it blows up as Ωκ → 0, since the denominator includes a factor
of |Ωκ|5/2. By itself, the divergence isn’t surprising; the set of classical trajectories is non-
compact. The more interesting fact is where it diverges – for universes that are spatially flat
(Ωκ = 0), which is certainly a physically relevant region of parameter space.
This divergence was noted in the original GHS paper [63], where it was attributed to
“universes with very large scale factors” due to a different choice of variables. That char-
acterization isn’t very useful, since “large scale factor” is a feature along the trajectory of
any open universe, rather than picking out a particular type of trajectory. Later works
[65, 66, 67] correctly described the divergence as arising from nearly-flat universes. Gibbons
and Turok [67] advocated dealing with the infinity by discarding all flat universes by fiat,
and concentrating on the non-flat universes. Tam and I [64] took the opposite view: what
(25) is telling us is that almost every Robertson-Walker cosmology is spatially flat. Rather
than throwing such trajectories away, we should throw all of the others away and deal with
flat universes.
What one wants, therefore, is a measure purely on the space of flat universes. The
procedure we advocated in [64] for obtaining such a measure was faulty, as our suggested
regularization gave a result that was not invariant under a choice of surface on which to
evaluate the measure. This problem was later solved in [68], which derived a measure on
the phase space for flat universes by demanding that it obey Liouville’s theorem, and [69],
which used this to derive a measure on the space of trajectories. Applying this to the case
of inflation, we showed that one generically expects a very large amount of inflation for
unbounded potentials such as V (φ) ∝ φ2, and relatively few e-folds for “natural” inflation
[70] in which V (φ) ∝ cos(φ).
From the point of view of fine-tuning, using the GHS measure completely alters our
picture of the flatness problem. We noted that the conventional formulation of the problem
implicitly assumes a measure that is uniform in Ωκ, which seemed intuitively reasonable.
But in fact the measure in the vicinity of flat universes turns out to be proportional to
1/|Ωκ|5/2, which is a dramatic difference. Rather than sufficiently flat universes being rare,
they are actually generic. We take this result to indicate that the flatness problem really
isn’t a problem at all; it was simply a mistake, brought about by considering an informal
measure rather than one derived from the dynamics.
4.4 Smoothness
The surprising result that almost all universes are spatially flat might raise the hope that
a careful consideration of the measure might also explain the smoothness of the universe:
perhaps almost all cosmological trajectories are extremely smooth at early times. Sadly, the
opposite is true, as can be seen by extending the GHS measure to perturbed spacetimes
[64]. This might seem like a difficult task, since there are many ways the universe can be
perturbed. But as long as the perturbations are small, every Fourier mode evolves indepen-
dently according to a linear equation of motion. Therefore, we can consider the measure on
a mode-by-mode basis.
For linear scalar perturbations, the coupled dynamics of a matter/radiation fluid and
the spacetime curvature in a background spacetime can be described by a single degree of
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freedom, the cosmological perturbation field u(~x, t), as discussed by Mukhanov, Feldman and
Brandenberger [71]. Given the action for this field, we can isolate the dynamical variables
and construct the symplectic two-form on phase space, which can then be used to compute
the measure on the set of solutions to Einstein’s equations. Various subtleties arise along
the way, but the final answer is relatively straightforward. Here I will just quote the results;
calculations can be found in [64].
It is convenient to switch to conformal time,
η =
∫
a−1dt. (26)
Derivatives with respect to η are denoted by the superscript ′, and H˜ ≡ a′/a is related to the
Hubble parameter H = a˙/a by H˜ = aH . In Fourier space the cosmological perturbation field
is a function u(~k, t), where ~k is the comoving wave vector. It is essentially a scaled version
of the 00 component of the metric perturbation, which is just the Newtonian gravitational
potential:
Φ = (ρ¯+ p¯)1/2u, (27)
where ρ¯ and p¯ are the background energy density and pressure. From that we can express
the energy density perturbation in conformal Newtonian gauge,
δρ =
1
4πGa2
[
∇2Φ− 3H˜(Φ′ + H˜Φ)
]
. (28)
The cosmological perturbation field obeys an equation of motion
u′′ − c2s∇2u−
θ′′
θ
u = 0. (29)
Here, cs is the speed of sound in the matter/radiation fluid, and θ(η) is a time-dependent
parameter given by
θ =
1
a
[
2
3
(
1− H˜
′
H˜2
)]−1/2
. (30)
This equation of motion can be derived from an action
Su =
1
2
∫
d4x
(
u′2 − c2s
∑
i
∂iu∂iu+
θ′′
θ
u2
)
. (31)
Defining the conjugate momentum pu = ∂L/∂u′ = u′, we can describe the dynamics in terms
of a Hamiltonian for an individual mode with wavenumber k,
H = 1
2
p2u +
1
2
(
c2sk
2 − θ
′′
θ
)
u2. (32)
This is simply the Hamiltonian for a single degree of freedom with a time-dependent effective
mass m2 = c2sk
2 − θ′′/θ.
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One convenient hypersurface in which we can evaluate the flux of trajectories is η = η∗ =
constant. A straightforward calculation shows that the measure evaluated on such a surface
is simply
µ =
∫
η=η∗
du dpu. (33)
In other words, the measure on a perturbation mode is completely uniform in the {u, pu}
variables, much as we might have na¨ıvely guessed, and in stark contrast to the flatness
problem. All values for u and pu are equally likely; there is nothing in the measure that
would explain the small observed values of perturbations at early times. Hence, the observed
homogeneity of our universe does imply considerable fine-tuning.
We can use this measure to roughly quantify how much fine-tuning is involved in the
conventional assumption of a smooth universe near the Big Bang. For purposes of conve-
nience, [64] asked a simple question: assuming that the universe had the observed amount
of uniformity at the surface of last scattering (δρ/ρ¯ ≤ 10−5), what fraction of the allowed
trajectories were also smooth in the very early universe, say near the scale of grand unifi-
cation when the energy density was ρ ∼ (1016GeV)4? The answer is, unsurprisingly, quite
small. For each individual mode, the chance that it was small at the GUT scale given that
it is small at recombination is of order 10−66. But there are many modes, and if any one
of them is large then the universe is not truly smooth. The total fraction of universes that
were smooth at early times is just the product of the fractions corresponding to each mode.
Choosing reasonable bounds for the largest and smallest modes considered, the total fraction
of trajectories that are smooth at early times works out to be
f(smooth at GUT scale|smooth at recombination) ≈ 10−6.6×107 . (34)
This represents a very conservative estimate for the amount of fine-tuning involved in the
standard cosmological model.
It might seem strange to ask a conditional question that assumes the universe was smooth
at the time of last scattering, rather than directly inquiring about the fraction of universes
that were smooth at recombination. But that fraction is ill-defined, since the phase space
of perturbations is unbounded. We could have calculated the fraction of universes that are
relatively smooth today that were also smooth at recombination, and obtained a similarly
tiny number. More importantly, we are interested in the fine-tuning necessary for the universe
to obey the Past Hypothesis. The reason why (34) is such a small number is that most
trajectories that are smooth at last scattering contain modes that were large at earlier
times but decayed. That is morally equivalent to trajectories that start with relatively high
entropy, but that start with delicate correlations that cause the entropy to decrease as time
passes. All of conventional cosmology assumes that the early universe was not like that; (34)
quantifies the amount of fine-tuning implied by this assumption.
We can therefore conclude that the smoothness of the early universe does indeed represent
an enormous amount of fine-tuning. In reaching this conclusion, we made no reference to the
causal structure nor to any thwarted attempts at equilibration. Those considerations, which
play a central role in formulating the horizon problem, are red herrings. The real sense in
which the early universe was fine-tuned is extremely simple: the overwhelming majority of
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cosmological trajectories, as quantified by the canonical measure, are highly nonuniform at
early times, and we don’t think the real universe was like that. Clearly, the specific numerical
value we obtain is not of central importance; what is certain is that the history of our actual
universe does not look anything like it was chosen randomly.
5 Discussion
I have argued that the traditional discussion of the fine-tuning of the early universe in terms of
the horizon and flatness problems is misguided. The flatness problem is based on an implicit
use of an unjustified measure on the space of initial conditions; when a more natural measure
is used, we see that almost all Robertson-Walker universes are spatially flat. The difficulty
with the horizon problem is not that it is incorrect, but that it is inconclusive, since we don’t
have a clear picture of how the situation would change if distant regions on the surface of
last scattering actually had been in causal contact. It is much more sensible to quantify
fine-tuning in terms of the measure on the space of cosmological trajectories. From that
perspective, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of such trajectories, conditionalized
on some reasonable requirement in the late universe, are wildly inhomogeneous at early
times. The fact that the actual early universe was not like that, as specified by the Past
Hypothesis, gives us a clear handle on the kind of fine-tuning we are faced with.
As with most discussions of fine-tuning, in this paper I have prejudiced the discussion
somewhat by assuming throughout that the universe is an approximately Robertson-Walker
cosmology with a certain (large) amount of matter and radiation. While we have seen that
the universe is fine-tuned even given that framework, such an assumption is much stronger
than what is required, for example, by the anthropic principle. Life can certainly exist in
universes with far fewer stars and galaxies than what we observe. In the presence of a
stable vacuum energy, the highest-entropy configuration for the universe to be in is empty
de Sitter space [2]. The worry there is that vacuum fluctuations give rise to an ensemble
of freak “Boltzmann brain” observers [72, 73, 74].15 As argued in [27], however, quantum
fluctuations in de Sitter space don’t actually bring into existence decohered branches of the
wave function containing such freak observers. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to think
that the space of trajectories containing one person or one galaxy in an otherwise empty
background has a much greater measure than the kind of universe in which we live, with
over a hundred billion galaxies; at least, such a situation has a much higher entropy. We
are therefore still left with the fundamental cosmological question: “Why don’t we live in a
nearly-empty de Sitter space?”
Formulating cosmological fine-tuning in the language of the measure on trajectories puts
the inflationary-universe scenario in its proper context. A major original motivation of
15The problem is not that a de Sitter scenario predicts that “we should be Boltzmann brains.” Rather, we
should consider ourselves to be one of any of the many observers that find themselves in precisely our current
cognitive situation. For most such observers, that cognitive situation – e.g., my current belief that there is
a person named “David Albert” who wrote a book entitled Time and Chance – is completely uncorrelated
with the reality of their actual environment. Such a situation is cognitively unstable, for reasons explained
in related contexts in [3] (at least, to the best of my current recollection).
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inflation was to solve the horizon and flatness problems. Reformulating the issue raised
by the horizon problem as a matter of the measure on cosmological trajectories brings the
problem with inflation into sharp focus: the fact that most trajectories that are homogeneous
at late times are highly non-homogeneous at early times is completely independent of physical
processes in the early universe. It depends only on the measure evaluated at relatively late
times. Inflation, therefore, cannot solve this problem all by itself. Indeed, the measure
reinforces the argument made by Penrose, that the initial conditions necessary for getting
inflation to start are extremely fine-tuned, more so than those of the conventional Big Bang
model it was meant to help fix. Inflation does, however, still have very attractive features.
It posits an initial condition that, while very low-entropy, is also extremely simple, not to
mention physically quite small. (With inflation, our observable universe could have been one
Planck length across at the Planck density; without inflation, the same patch was of order
one centimeter across at that time. That is an incredibly large volume, when considered in
Planck units, over which to have initial homogeneity.) Therefore, while inflation does not
remove the need for a theory of initial conditions, it gives those trying to construct such a
theory a relatively reasonable target to shoot for.
Of course, all of this discussion about fine-tuning and the cosmological measure would be
completely pointless if we did have a well-formulated theory of initial conditions (or, better,
of our cosmological history considered as a whole). Ultimately the goal is not to explain why
our universe appears unnatural; it’s to explain why we live in this specific universe. Making
its apparent unnaturalness precise is hopefully a step toward achieving this lofty ambition.
Acknowledgments
It is a pleasure to thank David Albert for inspiration and conversations over the years, Barry
Loewer for his patience, Shelly Goldstein for useful discussions, my collaborators Heywood
Tam and Grant Remmen for their invaluable insights, and Tim Maudlin for the interactions
that proximately inspired this paper. This research is funded in part by DOE grant DE-
SC0011632, and by the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation through Grant 776 to the
Caltech Moore Center for Theoretical Cosmology and Physics.
References
[1] R. Penrose, “Difficulties with inflationary cosmology,”
Annals N.Y.Acad.Sci. 571 (1989) 249–264.
[2] S. M. Carroll and J. Chen, “Spontaneous inflation and the origin of the arrow of
time,” arXiv:hep-th/0410270.
[3] D. Albert, Time and Chance. Harvard University Press, 2003.
[4] J. Earman, “The past hypothesis: not even false,” Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 37 no. 3,
(2006) 399–430.
23
[5] D. Wallace, “The logic of the past hypothesis,” November, 2011.
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/8894/. To appear in B. Loewer, E. Winsberg
and B. Weslake (ed.), currently-untitled volume discussing David Albert’s Time and
Chance.
[6] A. H. Guth, “The Inflationary Universe: A Possible Solution to the Horizon and
Flatness Problems,” Phys. Rev. D23 (1981) 347–356.
[7] C. W. Misner, “Mixmaster universe,” Physical Review Letters 22 no. 20, (1969)
1071–1074.
[8] R. H. Dicke and P. J. E. Peebles, “The big bang cosmology-enigmas and nostrums,” in
General relativity: an Einstein centenary survey, vol. 1, pp. 504–517. 1979.
[9] R. Brawer, Inflationary cosmology and horizon and flatness problems: the mutual
constitution of explanation and questions. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1995.
[10] Planck Collaboration Collaboration, P. Ade et al., “Planck 2013 results. I.
Overview of products and scientific results,” arXiv:1303.5062 [astro-ph.CO].
[11] E. F. Bunn and D. W. Hogg, “The kinematic origin of the cosmological redshift,”
American Journal of Physics 77 (Aug., 2009) 688–694,
arXiv:0808.1081 [physics.pop-ph].
[12] C. A. Egan and C. H. Lineweaver, “A larger estimate of the entropy of the universe,”
The Astrophysical Journal 710 no. 2, (2010) 1825.
[13] T. Banks, “Cosmological breaking of supersymmetry or little Lambda goes back to the
future. II,” arXiv:hep-th/0007146.
[14] T. Banks and W. Fischler, “M-theory observables for cosmological space-times,”
arXiv:hep-th/0102077.
[15] S. Aaronson, S. M. Carroll, and L. Ouellette, “Quantifying the Rise and Fall of
Complexity in Closed Systems: The Coffee Automaton,”
arXiv:1405.6903 [cond-mat.stat-mech].
[16] H. Price, “Cosmology, time’s arrow, and that old double standard,”
arXiv:gr-qc/9310022.
[17] S. Goldstein, “unpublished,” 2014.
[18] D. Lynden-Bell and R. Wood, “The gravo-thermal catastrophe in isothermal spheres
and the onset of red-giant structure for stellar systems,” Monthly Notices Roy. Astron.
Soc. 138 (1968) 495.
24
[19] R. Nityananda, “The gravitational dynamics of galaxies,” Pramana 73 no. 1, (2009)
193–214. http://www.ias.ac.in/pubs/splpubs/pjubileebook/361.pdf.
[20] B. Greene, K. Hinterbichler, S. Judes, and M. K. Parikh, “Smooth Initial Conditions
from Weak Gravity,” Phys.Lett. B697 (2011) 178–183, arXiv:0911.0693 [hep-th].
[21] R. M. Wald, “Asymptotic behavior of homogeneous cosmological models in the
presence of a positive cosmological constant,” Physical Review D 28 no. 8, (1983) 2118.
[22] A. D. Linde, “A New Inflationary Universe Scenario: A Possible Solution of the
Horizon, Flatness, Homogeneity, Isotropy and Primordial Monopole Problems,”
Phys. Lett. B108 (1982) 389–393.
[23] A. Albrecht and P. J. Steinhardt, “Cosmology for Grand Unified Theories with
Radiatively Induced Symmetry Breaking,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 48 (1982) 1220–1223.
[24] P. Anninos, R. Matzner, T. Rothman, and M. Ryan, “How does inflation isotropize
the universe?,” Phys.Rev. D43 (1991) 3821–3832.
[25] T. Vachaspati and M. Trodden, “Causality and cosmic inflation,”
Phys. Rev. D61 (2000) 023502, arXiv:gr-qc/9811037.
[26] A. H. Guth, “Inflation and eternal inflation,” Phys. Rept. 333 (2000) 555–574,
arXiv:astro-ph/0002156.
[27] K. K. Boddy, S. M. Carroll, and J. Pollack, “De Sitter Space Without Quantum
Fluctuations,” arXiv:1405.0298 [hep-th].
[28] A. Ijjas, P. J. Steinhardt, and A. Loeb, “Inflationary paradigm in trouble after
Planck2013,” Phys.Lett. B723 (2013) 261–266, arXiv:1304.2785 [astro-ph.CO].
[29] A. H. Guth, D. I. Kaiser, and Y. Nomura, “Inflationary paradigm after Planck 2013,”
Phys.Lett. B733 (2014) 112–119, arXiv:1312.7619 [astro-ph.CO].
[30] A. Linde, “Inflationary Cosmology after Planck 2013,” arXiv:1402.0526 [hep-th].
[31] A. Ijjas, P. J. Steinhardt, and A. Loeb, “Inflationary schism after Planck2013,”
arXiv:1402.6980 [astro-ph.CO].
[32] S. M. Carroll, “What if Time Really Exists?,” arXiv:0811.3772 [gr-qc].
[33] A. Borde, A. H. Guth, and A. Vilenkin, “Inflationary space-times are incompletein
past directions,” Phys.Rev.Lett. 90 (2003) 151301, arXiv:gr-qc/0110012 [gr-qc].
[34] A. Mithani and A. Vilenkin, “Did the universe have a beginning?,”
arXiv:1204.4658 [hep-th].
[35] A. Aguirre and S. Gratton, “Steady-state eternal inflation,”
Phys. Rev. D65 (2002) 083507, arXiv:astro-ph/0111191.
25
[36] T. Kibble, “Geometrization of quantum mechanics,” Communications in Mathematical
Physics 65 no. 2, (1979) 189–201.
[37] D. Brody and L. Hughston, “Geometric quantum mechanics,”
J.Geom.Phys. 38 (2001) 19–53, arXiv:quant-ph/9906086 [quant-ph].
[38] I. Bengtsson, J. Braennlund, and K. Zyczkowski, “CP**n, or, entanglement
illustrated,” Int.J.Mod.Phys. A17 (2002) 4675–4696,
arXiv:quant-ph/0108064 [quant-ph].
[39] D. L. Wiltshire, “An Introduction to quantum cosmology,”
arXiv:gr-qc/0101003 [gr-qc].
[40] D. N. Page and W. K. Wootters, “Evolution without evolution: Dynamics described
by stationary observables,” Phys.Rev. D27 (1983) 2885.
[41] T. Banks, “T C P, Quantum Gravity, the Cosmological Constant and All That...,”
Nucl.Phys. B249 (1985) 332.
[42] G. ’t Hooft, “Dimensional reduction in quantum gravity,” arXiv:gr-qc/9310026.
[43] L. Susskind, “The World as a hologram,” J. Math. Phys. 36 (1995) 6377–6396,
arXiv:hep-th/9409089.
[44] R. Bousso, “The holographic principle,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 (2002) 825–874,
arXiv:hep-th/0203101.
[45] L. Susskind, L. Thorlacius, and J. Uglum, “The Stretched horizon and black hole
complementarity,” Phys. Rev. D48 (1993) 3743–3761, arXiv:hep-th/9306069.
[46] J. M. Maldacena, “The Large N limit of superconformal field theories and
supergravity,” Adv.Theor.Math.Phys. 2 (1998) 231–252,
arXiv:hep-th/9711200 [hep-th].
[47] G. T. Horowitz and J. Polchinski, “Gauge/gravity duality,”
arXiv:gr-qc/0602037 [gr-qc].
[48] S. Ryu and T. Takayanagi, “Holographic derivation of entanglement entropy from
AdS/CFT,” Phys.Rev.Lett. 96 (2006) 181602, arXiv:hep-th/0603001 [hep-th].
[49] B. Swingle, “Entanglement renormalization and holography,”
Phys. Rev. D 86 no. 6, (Sept., 2012) 065007, arXiv:0905.1317 [cond-mat.str-el].
[50] M. Van Raamsdonk, “Building up spacetime with quantum entanglement,”
Gen.Rel.Grav. 42 (2010) 2323–2329, arXiv:1005.3035 [hep-th].
[51] J. Maldacena and L. Susskind, “Cool horizons for entangled black holes,”
Fortsch.Phys. 61 (2013) 781–811, arXiv:1306.0533 [hep-th].
26
[52] T. Jacobson, “Thermodynamics of space-time: The Einstein equation of state,”
Phys.Rev.Lett. 75 (1995) 1260–1263, arXiv:gr-qc/9504004 [gr-qc].
[53] E. P. Verlinde, “On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton,”
JHEP 1104 (2011) 029, arXiv:1001.0785 [hep-th].
[54] S. Winitzki, “Predictions in eternal inflation,” Lect.Notes Phys. 738 (2008) 157–191,
arXiv:gr-qc/0612164 [gr-qc].
[55] A. Aguirre, S. Gratton, and M. C. Johnson, “Hurdles for recent measures in eternal
inflation,” Phys.Rev. D75 (2007) 123501, arXiv:hep-th/0611221 [hep-th].
[56] A. D. Linde, V. Vanchurin, and S. Winitzki, “Stationary Measure in the Multiverse,”
JCAP 0901 (2009) 031, arXiv:0812.0005 [hep-th].
[57] D. Schwartz-Perlov and A. Vilenkin, “Measures for a Transdimensional Multiverse,”
JCAP 1006 (2010) 024, arXiv:1004.4567 [hep-th].
[58] B. Freivogel, “Making predictions in the multiverse,”
Class.Quant.Grav. 28 (2011) 204007, arXiv:1105.0244 [hep-th].
[59] M. P. Salem, “Bubble collisions and measures of the multiverse,”
JCAP 1201 (2012) 021, arXiv:1108.0040 [hep-th].
[60] B. Loewer, “The emergence of time’s arrows and special science laws from physics,”
Interface focus 2 no. 1, (2012) 13–19.
[61] J. S. Schiffrin and R. M. Wald, “Measure and Probability in Cosmology,”
Phys.Rev. D86 (2012) 023521, arXiv:1202.1818 [gr-qc].
[62] S. M. Carroll, Spacetime and Geometry: An Introduction to General Relativity. San
Francisco, USA: Addison-Wesley (2004), 513 p.
[63] G. Gibbons, S. Hawking, and J. Stewart, “A Natural Measure on the Set of All
Universes,” Nucl.Phys. B281 (1987) 736.
[64] S. M. Carroll and H. Tam, “Unitary Evolution and Cosmological Fine-Tuning,”
arXiv:1007.1417 [hep-th].
[65] S. Hawking and D. N. Page, “How probable is inflation?,”
Nucl.Phys. B298 (1988) 789–809.
[66] D. Coule, “Canonical measure and the flatness of a FRW universe,”
Class.Quant.Grav. 12 (1995) 455–470, arXiv:gr-qc/9408026 [gr-qc].
[67] G. Gibbons and N. Turok, “The Measure Problem in Cosmology,”
Phys.Rev. D77 (2008) 063516, arXiv:hep-th/0609095 [hep-th].
27
[68] G. N. Remmen and S. M. Carroll, “Attractor Solutions in Scalar-Field Cosmology,”
Phys.Rev. D88 (2013) 083518, arXiv:1309.2611 [gr-qc].
[69] G. N. Remmen and S. M. Carroll, “How Many e-Folds Should We Expect from
High-Scale Inflation?,” arXiv:1405.5538 [hep-th].
[70] K. Freese, J. A. Frieman, and A. V. Olinto, “Natural inflation with pseudo -
Nambu-Goldstone bosons,” Phys.Rev.Lett. 65 (1990) 3233–3236.
[71] V. F. Mukhanov, H. Feldman, and R. H. Brandenberger, “Theory of cosmological
perturbations. Part 1. Classical perturbations. Part 2. Quantum theory of
perturbations. Part 3. Extensions,” Phys.Rept. 215 (1992) 203–333.
[72] L. Dyson, M. Kleban, and L. Susskind, “Disturbing implications of a cosmological
constant,” JHEP 10 (2002) 011.
[73] A. Albrecht and L. Sorbo, “Can the universe afford inflation?,”
Phys. Rev. D70 (2004) 063528, arXiv:hep-th/0405270.
[74] R. Bousso and B. Freivogel, “A Paradox in the global description of the multiverse,”
JHEP 0706 (2007) 018, arXiv:hep-th/0610132 [hep-th].
28
